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Ilorizontal agreements:
Concept and proof
BY GEORGE A. HAY*
I. INTRODUCTION
It is well established that, absent some very special circumstances,
agreements on price or certain other terms of trade by otherwise com-
peting entities (i.e., "horizontal agreements") are unlawful per se
under the Sherman Act.1 In practical effect, once the fact of the hori-
zontal agreement has been established, an adverse impact on compe-
tition is presumed, and therefore that the plaintiff is spared the
burden of proving such an impact. The principal task for plaintiffs in
such cases, therefore, is establishing the existence of an agreement.2
In the ideal world (from plaintiffs' perspective), there would be
"hard" evidence of a "formal" agreement. By "formal" agreement, I
* Edward Cornell Professor of Law & Professor of Economics, The Cor-
nell Law School.
1 Most of the exceptions involve circumstances where the agreement in
question is ancillary to an otherwise legitimate joint venture, such as a league,
where it can be demonstrated that the agreement in question is necessary for
the joint venture to function effectively. Hence, courts frequently use the term
"naked" restraint to describe the situation where the per se rule will apply.
2 In cases involving foreign firms and conduct that occurred in foreign
countries, there also may be a dispute about whether U.S. antitrust law,
including the per se rule, applies at all. See, e.g., F. Hoffmann-LaRoche v.
Empagran, 542 U.S. 155 (2004).
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mean that the parties actually met or otherwise explicitly communi-
cated agreement on a course of action, and by "hard" evidence, I
mean that there is testimony from a live witness present when the
communication occurred, a video or audio recording of the communi-
cation, or a document created by one of more of the parties that docu-
ments the fact of the agreement.
Of course, the world is not always ideal and most of the litigated
cases involve situations in which there is no hard evidence of a formal
agreement. 3 In such cases, the plaintiff is forced to ask the court to
infer an agreement from circumstantial evidence. However, as we
shall see, what makes this task difficult for the plaintiff is that it may
involve some complex combination of a detective story (what actually
happened?), where economic analysis is often an essential ingredient,
and a theoretical legal argument (does what happened constitute an
unlawful agreement?). It is the possibility of this complex combina-
tion of economic evidence and legal theory that also poses challenges
for the court, whether in fashioning instructions for the jury or in rul-
ing on motions (typically by defendants) for summary judgment,
directed verdict, judgment notwithstanding the verdict and, most
recently, motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim.'
In what follows, I attempt to identify the challenges and to explain
when and how economic analysis may be of assistance, but at the
same time, identifying areas where the principal concerns are legal
rather than economic, i.e., where legal creativity may be required for
an effective solution. In that vein, the article will discuss the concept
of "facilitating practices" and assess whether the concept may be use-
ful in filling an important gap in the coverage of the Sherman Act.
3 Where there is hard evidence of a formal agreement, the per se rule
normally leads to a settlement, since there is little to argue about except for
the amount of damages in a private civil suit.
4 Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 126 S. Ct. 2965 (2006), where a petition for
a writ of certiorari was granted. In all likelihood, this case will have been
decided by the time this article is published.
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II. AGREEMENT UNDER THE SHERMAN ACT
A. The legal status of price fixing and related agreements
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[elvery contract, combina-
tion in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations .. " At
least in the modern era, courts seem not to be concerned about distin-
guishing among the terms "contract," "combination," and "conspiracy"
and most antitrust students are taught simply that the section pro-
hibits agreements in restraint of trade. After allowing for the substitu-
tion of "agreement" for the "contract, combination, or conspiracy"
triplet, the statute is concise and seems unequivocal. While it turns
out that, as the statute has been interpreted over the past hundred-
plus years, questions have emerged about whether the statute really
does prohibit every agreement in restraint of trade, we do not need to
spend time discussing the development of the "per se" rule and its
application as contrasted with the "rule of reason." For our purposes
it is enough to indicate that, unless they occur in the context of a joint
venture or in truly extraordinary circumstances, all price fixing
agreements among competitors are illegal per se,5 as are all boycotts
aimed at an actual or potential competitor. 6 Therefore, in these con-
texts, as a practical matter the only question is whether in fact an
agreement to fix prices or an agreement to engage in a boycott can be
established.
7
5 Section 1 also covers vertical agreements, including vertical price fix-
ing. While vertical price fixing is also illegal per se, in practice the policy and
evidentiary issues are somewhat different, and we will not discuss vertical
arrangements in what follows.
6 Often the only way to target a competitor is indirect, e.g., by refusing
to deal with an input supplier that also supplies the targeted competitor or
refusing to sell to a customer that also buys from the targeted competitor. So
in those cases, while there is an immediate victim (the input supplier or the
customer), the ultimate target is the competitor.
7 In private treble damage cases, the plaintiff also needs to establish
the degree to which the agreement actually affected prices. Hence, some ele-
ments of what might otherwise be a "reasonableness" defense come in
through the back door in an effort to show that there was no anticompetitive
impact.
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B. Explicit agreements
While the question of whether there is an agreement seems pri-
marily a question of evidence, it is inextricably linked with the more
conceptual question of what we mean by an agreement for purposes
of enforcing the Sherman Act. As an initial matter, there is no dispute
about the proposition that the reference to "contract, combination...
or conspiracy" did not intend to, and does not in fact, limit the cover-
age of the statute to legally enforceable contracts. Under the common
law even the most explicit price fixing agreement, written in ink and
signed by all parties, would not have been legally enforceable, yet
there is no dispute that such a document would satisfy the definition
of agreement under the Sherman Act. Nor does the agreement have to
be in writing. The agreement can be oral rather than written (still
legally unenforceable), and the antitrust archives are filled with cases
in which the parties met to fix prices but there was no written agree-
ment. And, whether the communication is written or oral, it is proba-
bly not even necessary that each party say "I agree" or its semantic
equivalent; but the slope becomes a bit slippery at this point since,
despite the warnings of Adam Smith,8 it is possible to imagine situa-
tions where a group of competitors are gathered in the same room,9
prices are discussed," and prices go up over some period of time fol-
lowing the gathering," yet the court would not find that the parties
had agreed to fix prices.
12
8 ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS § 1.10.82 (Edwin Cannan ed., Methuen & Co. 1904) (1776) ("People of
the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but
the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some con-
trivance to raise prices").
9 For example, doctors from a given specialty at a medical conference.
10 "The insurance companies are pushing prices so low that there is little
incentive to remain in this specialty."
11 A significant number of doctors leave the particular specialty in
response to what they perceive as unreasonably low prices.
12 This is not to suggest that a competent attorney would not warn his or
her clients about the risks associated with attendance at such a meeting or
participation in any discussion of prices.
HeinOnline -- 51 Antitrust Bull. 880 2006
HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS : 881
In any event, for now it is sufficient to assert that any explicit
agreement, whether it is reduced to writing or takes the form simply of
a face-to-face discussion, or even a direct telephonic or computer
exchange, will be enough for Sherman Act purposes. It will be up to
the courts to decide whether the precise words that are exchanged in
such explicit interactions are enough to constitute an agreement.
While some of the conceptual issues I discuss below will be relevant
to such a determination, situations in which a group of competitors
are in direct communication with one another about future prices are
not the ones that give rise to the most serious analytical issues.1 3 The
law's basic attitude is that competitors normally have no legitimate
purpose for discussing prices with one another (even worse if the dis-
cussions occur in secret) and where there is some movement of prices
in the wake of such discussions, these "competitors" will face a
daunting task of overcoming the presumption that the conversations
constituted or resulted in an agreement.
14
13 Professors Areeda and Hovenkamp offer the following example:
Suppose, for example, that one entrepreneur invites its major rivals to
dinner. After dinner, the host announces future price intentions and
one or more of the guests do the same. The only objection to finding
an agreement to exchange this information is the guests' claim that
they were taken by surprise. But we can reject this objection because
the guests had an option: although it might have been socially uncom-
fortable, the guests could have departed as soon as the host began to
transform the social occasion into a conspiratorial one.
PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF
ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION § 1406c (2d ed. 2003).
14 A brief discussion about the difference between these two concepts
might be productive. Consider the following hypothetical. There is undis-
puted evidence that the parties met and they all agreed that despite the cur-
rent market price of $100, the industry joint profit-maximizing price would be
$200. Furthermore, there was discussion of and agreement about the proposi-
tion that for any individual firm to charge $200 while its competitors main-
tained the price at $100 would be disastrous for the individual firm.
However, no firm offered to initiate a price increase and no firm pledged to
follow a price increase if one of its competitors initiated it. Yet a few days
later, one firm visibly increases its prices and all the rest follow shortly there-
after. There is almost no question that a court would find that this conduct
violated the Sherman Act. The court might say either that the discussions
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Courts are also prepared to find illegal agreements even when the
communication among the parties is indirect, as opposed to the situa-
tion where all the parties are in the room together or are all on the
same telephone call. One particularly important example is the so-
called "hub and spoke" conspiracy where there is an intermediary
that speaks individually to each of the competitors and then relays
each competitor's "agreement" to increase prices or engage in some
other form of anticompetitive conduct to the other competitors in a
series of one-on-one conversations. Thus in Interstate Circuit,5 an
owner of a chain of first-run theaters (with considerable market
power in certain geographic areas) communicated separately with
each of eight major film producers and encouraged them to impose
onerous (and anticompetitive) terms on the so-called "second-run
theaters" that competed to some extent with the owner in question.
The Court determined that each film producer would be reluctant to
impose such terms on the second-run theaters without some assur-
ance that the other film producers would do the same; the individual
communications between the theater owner and each of the individ-
ual film producers provided such assurance by making each film pro-
ducer aware that the theater owner was having similar conversations
with each of the producers' rivals. (The Court also indicated that an
explicit agreement was not necessary for the plaintiff to have violated
the Sherman Act, but we defer a discussion of that part of the opinion
for the time being.)
More recently, the same pattern was condemned in the Toys "R"
Us case, 16 where Toys "R" Us (TRU), a major toy retailer, tried to per-
suade several of the important toy manufacturers to impose unfavor-
able terms on the discount chains that competed against TRU. When a
manufacturer individually indicated concern about being at a com-
constituted an illegal agreement or that the discussions resulted in an illegal
(albeit unspoken) agreement or understanding. The latter is probably more
precise as a logical matter but the former would probably be regarded as an
acceptable legal shortcut. In any event, there would likely be little discussion of
the distinction. I will have more to say about such a shortcut in what follows.
15 Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
16 Toys "R" Us, Inc. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 221 F.3d 928 (7th Cir.
2000).
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petitive disadvantage if it was the only manufacturer that went along
with TRU's demands, TRU allegedly provided the assurance that
each of the other manufacturers was being presented with the same
demands and eventually assured each manufacturer that each of its
competitors would go along so long as everyone else indicated that
they would do the same.
C. Proving explicit agreements
As a general evidentiary matter, the existence of an explicit agree-
ment can be established either through direct evidence (e.g., a "hot"
document, a tape recording of one or more meetings, or a cooperative
witness who was present at the meetings), or from circumstantial evi-
dence. While the issue of what circumstantial evidence is adequate to
allow a jury to infer that the parties entered into an explicit agreement
is not necessarily an easy one, no exotic legal doctrine is required. The
issue boils down to an economic detective story in which one side
tries to make the case that there is no plausible explanation for the
conduct other than some kind of agreement, and the other side tries
to explain how the behavior under scrutiny (e.g., parallel price
increases) could have come about through normal market forces, or at
least from actions that could not fairly be described as constituting an
agreement.
Thus, for example, the Court in Interstate Circuit referred to the
defendants' "radical departure" from their previous business prac-
tices and also to the significant risk that would attach to a single film
distributor (i.e., a producer) if only that one distributor were to accede
to Interstate's demands. 17 The clear suggestion was that there was no
other plausible explanation for the observed change in the terms
imposed on the second-run theaters by the distributors other than
some kind of explicit agreement, whether this was achieved by direct
communication among the distributors themselves or indirectly, with
Interstate acting as the intermediary. Similarly, and hypothetically, if
numerous sealed bids for a construction project were opened and
found to be identical to the last decimal point, the plaintiff would
argue that there is no explanation other than a prior agreement
17 Interstate Circuit, 306 U.S. at 222.
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(achieved, for example, at a hotel-room meeting or via telephone) for
the apparent coincidence, and the defendant would try to offer some
other plausible, nonconspiratorial, explanation.18
In this connection, mere parallel pricing (e.g., all firms increase
prices by roughly the same amount in roughly the same time period)
is normally not, by itself, enough to allow the inference of an agree-
ment.19 The simplest explanation for this is that parallel pricing can
occur in competitive markets when all firms experience the same cost
or demand factors. 20 Thus a plaintiff must establish more than mere
parallel pricing in order to argue that the observed price increases
were not simply the result of the normal competitive process.
21
D. The "plus factors"
While we argued above that the task of establishing through circum-
stantial evidence whether parallel conduct is the result of an explicit
agreement boils down to a relatively straightforward economics-based
puzzle (although not necessarily one that is easily solved), courts
have attempted to impose some structure on the jury's decisionmak-
ing process by identifying so-called "plus factors," and have
instructed the jury that where there is no direct evidence of a formal
agreement, an agreement may nevertheless be inferred from parallel
18 For example, a long-standing industry practice of pricing a construc-
tion project on a constant dollars per square foot basis.
19 Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 541
(1954) ("Conscious parallelism has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sher-
man Act").
20 An alternative explanation is that the parallel pricing was the result of
oligopolisitic interdependence without any agreement. This explanation is
discussed infra.
21 The case where all sealed bids are identical to the last decimal would
not be regarded as "mere" parallel pricing. Even in a competitive market, one
would normally not expect identical bids in sealed bid situations. Hence, this
extraordinary coincidence might support the inference of an agreement
unless the defendants could offer a plausible alternative explanation for how
it could have come about. As indicated above, see note 4, supra, the Court has
agreed to address what, if anything, the plaintiff needs to allege beyond mere
parallel conduct, in order to survive a motion to dismiss.
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conduct when one or more "plus factors" are present. Typical is the
appellate court's instruction in Blomkest Fertilizer:
An agreement is properly inferred from conscious parallelism only when
certain "plus factors" exist. A plus factor refers to "the additional facts or
factors required to be proved as a prerequisite to finding that the parallel
[price] action amounts to a conspiracy.22
The list of possible "plus factors" has varied from case to case-
some are generic and others are quite specific to the circumstances
of the case. The plus factors tend to fall in one of several general
categories.
The first category has to do with the incentive to collude. The cat-
egory is structural in the sense that it does not involve looking at the
actual conduct at issue but at preexisting conditions that would make
it plausible that the potential defendants would have some incentive
to try to reach an agreement despite the legal risks. Of course, virtu-
ally any industry would find successful collusion to be more profitable
than competition, 23 but this factor looks more to the likelihood that
collusion would in fact be likely to succeed and not be detected ("evi-
dence that the . . . market is one in which secret price fixing might
actually have an effect on price and thus be worth attempting 24).
Specific factors would include the degree of market concentration, the
ease of entry, the homogeneity of the product, transparency of prices,
and the presence or absence of large buyers.25 It would be surprising,
however, for a court to permit the jury to infer agreement from paral-
lel conduct based solely on plus factors in this structural category, no
matter how "favorable" they might be.
22 Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v. Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028,
1032-33 (8th Cir. 2000) (citations omitted).
23 The one exception would be an industry that faces a perfectly elastic
demand curve; therefore, even if operating cooperatively, it would have no
ability profitably to increase price above the competitive level.
24 In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 656 (7th
Cir. 2002).
2 These factors are discussed in more detail in section IV B, infra. See
also, George A. Hay, Oligopoly, Shared Monopoly, and Antirust Law, 67 CORNELL
L. REv. 439 (1982).
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A second category, which is perhaps best thought of as a blend of
structural and behavioral factors, represents "opportunities to col-
lude," and refers primarily to the existence of frequent interfirm com-
munications.26 These interfirm communications can be innocuous in
and of themselves (e.g., situations where executives of the various
defendants were in attendance at the same trade association meeting)
and therefore suggest merely the possibility of nefarious "off-the-
record" communications, or the communications can be presented as
inherently suspicious behavior (e.g., frequent telephone calls between
relevant employees of various industry participants) in the absence of
some alternative explanation for the communications. Again, it would
be rare for a court to permit a jury to infer an unlawful agreement
based merely on parallel conduct combined with frequent interfirm
communications. There must normally be some additional effort to
focus on the conduct itself beyond merely characterizing the conduct
as parallel or even "consciously parallel."
27
A third category could be labeled "coincidence" factors and
would apply in situations where the nature of the market is such that
firms cannot easily observe (and therefore follow, if they so desire)
other firms' actions. Hence, as discussed above, when a sealed pro-
cess yields multiple identical bids, the sealed nature of the process
would be a plus factor tending to suggest that such a coincidence
would not have been plausible absent a prior agreement.28 In Inter-
state Circuit, the Court regarded it as significant that the contract
terms from each of the eight film distributors were essentially identi-
cal by the time they were finalized despite the fact that they were rad-
ically different from the terms in the previous contracts and despite
the fact that the terms evolved over the course of what were suppos-
edly individualized negotiations between Interstate and each of the
26 See, e.g., Apex Oil v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246 (7th Cir. 2002).
27 Conscious parallelism means simply that the various firms were
aware of other firms' conduct when they made their own decisions. But this
can occur for virtually any consumer product where the same mechanism
that firms use to inform consumers of their prices inevitably also informs
other firms.
28 See, e.g., Federal Trade Comm'n v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683
(1948); C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co. v. United States, 197 F. 2d 489 (9th Cir. 1952).
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eight distributors. These circumstances made it implausible that the
terms of each of the eight contracts could have wound up being iden-
tical by coincidence and made it likely that the real explanation was
an agreement among the eight orchestrated by Interstate.29
The last category of plus factors is a catchall category that
focuses on the actual conduct at issue and, in the most general
sense, is used to persuade the jury that the conduct can best be
explained as stemming from agreement as opposed to independent
decisionmaking on the part of each individual firm. While there is
some overlap with the "coincidence" category, the factors in this last
category apply even in situations where firms can observe other
firms' actions and are used to suggest that this is not a sufficient
explanation for the parallel conduct. 30
The most frequently referenced plus factor in this category is
sometimes described as a party taking action against its own self-inter-
est, but this loose phrasing is misleading because economists generally
believe that a firm never acts contrary to its own self-interest. From the
plaintiff's perspective, the plus factor would be that the conduct is
rational (i.e., consistent with a firm's own self-interest) only in the con-
text of a prior agreement that all other competitors behave similarly.
The defendant's best response is that its own conduct is rational (i.e.,
consistent with its own self-interest) regardless of what the other com-
petitors do (and therefore no prior agreement is necessary).
A good illustration of this defense argument occurred in Theatre
Enterprises,31 where the defendants persuaded the Court that refusing
29 Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 221 (1939).
30 Of course, in the case of parallel conduct, it is virtually impossible for
a given defendant to "prove the negative," i.e., that there was no conspiracy,
since it will almost always be possible that the parallel conduct was the result
of an agreement, but the core of the each defendant's argument is that the
conduct can readily be explained as arising from independent decisionmak-
ing and therefore there is no basis for believing that a conspiracy was likely.
31 Theatre Enters. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346 U.S. 537, 540
(1954). The Crest was in suburban Baltimore and, under the exclusive dealing
arrangements that were common in the industry, each movie distributor
had to decide whether to open a new film in one of the traditional large,
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to deal with the Crest made sense for each defendant regardless of
what the others did, and hence there would be no motive to enter into
a conspiracy. Each defendant may have expected its rivals also to
refuse to deal with the Crest but that is neither surprising nor relevant
so long as each defendant can say that it would still have refused to
deal with the Crest even if it knew that one or more of its rivals
would behave differently. Similarly, when a firm's raw material costs
go up in a highly competitive market, it will want to increase price
and it will expect that rivals will do the same. However, the firm's
decision is not contingent on what its rivals do, as it is better to lose
some sales than to be selling below cost.
E. The "oligopoly defense"
While the ideal defense to a claim of conspiracy based on parallel
conduct is that each firm's behavior is rational regardless of what its
competitors do (and therefore there is no need to posit a prior agree-
ment to explain the parallel conduct), this defense will not always be
available, particularly in markets that are characterized by oligopoly.
The following hypothetical provides a useful reference point:
Consider two gas stations across the street from one another that are the
only two stations for miles around with (for whatever reason) no likeli-
downtown theaters, or to give it to the Crest. Given the demographics of the
time, the Court in effect concluded that a rational jury could have decided
that each distributor might have preferred to deal with the downtown the-
aters rather than with the Crest. The court, in rejecting plaintiff's claim that
the trial court should have directed a verdict in its favor, used the oft-quoted
sentence: "Circumstantial evidence of consciously parallel behavior may have
made heavy inroads into the traditional judicial attitude toward conspiracy;
but "conscious parallelism" has not yet read conspiracy out of the Sherman
Act." Id. at 541. Whatever the Court meant to signal by this passage, the use
of the phrase "conscious parallelism" in this context was probably ill advised.
To economists, the phrase has usually referred to a situation of oligopolistic
interdependence, where each party's best choice is very much dependent on
what its rivals do. But, as suggested above, there may not have been any
interdependence in Theatre Enterprises. Each distributor made a decision that
was independently rational. Whatever the law's attitude toward oligopolistic
interdependence, see section IV infra, no sensible commentator would suggest
that independently rational conduct should be the basis for an inference of
unlawful conspiracy.
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hood of entry in the foreseeable future. Assume that the profit-maxiniz-
ing cartel price is $2, and that this is clear to both sellers, but there is no
brand loyalty; i.e., consumers will buy from whichever is cheaper and
each has the capacity to service most or all of the customers. (If both
charge the same price, each will get half of the total sales.) Hence the two
stations collectively have a degree of market power but there is little or no
individual market power. Finally, assume further that, to this point, each
firm has been selling at $1.
In this scenario, each firm would wish that the market price were $2 but
would also realize that if one firm were to raise the price to $2 and the
other were to maintain the price at $1, the firm initiating the price
increase would lose all its business to the firm with the lower price. If that
happened, the high-price firm would be worse off than the status quo
and the low-price firm would be better off. Hence, at first blush, it
appears that neither firm will want to initiate the price increase without
prior agreement that its rival will follow. Hence, it would appear that,
absent agreement, prices will gravitate toward the competitive level.
However, that need not be the case. Assume that by law or industry cus-
tom, prices are posted prominently on signs in front of each station. Each
firm realizes that if it increases price to $2 it can easily see whether the
other has followed and can rescind the price increase promptly if it
observes that the other has not. Consumers cannot easily store gasoline,
so only a limited volume of sales will shift in the interim before the price
collapses back to $1. Thus, there is very little risk in initiating a price
increase. From the second firm's perspective, the short-run advantage of
not following a rival's price increase is limited and the long-run conse-
quence may be to preserve the lower price. Hence, it can be in the second
firm's interest to follow a rival's price increase, and the rival knows this. 32
The result is that the market price can move to (and remain at) $2 without
any direct or indirect communication between the parties, unless one
counts the posting of the price as "communication."
33
32 While the intuition supporting the hypothetical seems straightfor-
ward, the formal modeling of the hypothetical can be more complex. In a sim-
ple one-period game, the optimal strategy for the second firm is not to follow,
and simply adding a fixed number of additional periods doesn't necessarily
change the optimal strategy. See, e.g., Gregory J. Werden, Economic Evidence on
the Existence of Collusion: Reconciling Antitrust Law with Oligopoly Theory, 71
ANTITRUsT L.J. 719, 728-34 (2004).
33 Therefore we might have used the phrase "prohibited communica-
tion" since, for reasons discussed below, it is implausible that a court would
prohibit signs intended to notify consumers about an outlet's prices simply
because that sign also provided information to rival outlets.
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Note that, in this hypothetical, each station may be just as confi-
dent of how its competitor will act as it would have been had they
met in a hotel room the previous night and "agreed" to a parallel
increase. 34 And, by assumption, $2 is not a "competitive" price; con-
sumers are hurt just as badly as if the sellers had conspired explic-
itly. 35 Moreover, it is not quite right in this hypothetical to say that
each party's action is independently rational, at least in the sense used
above. Each seller's profits depend critically on what its rival does,
and neither would increase price if it knew that its rival would not.
The parties' fates are very much interdependent, much like the interde-
pendence that would prevail in a typical cartel.
However, in contrast to the typical cartel, to the extent that each
firm is confident that its rival will follow a price increase, that confi-
dence flows not from any prior communication or (explicit) agree-
ment, but from the very nature of their market: only a few firms exist,
barriers to entry are high, prices are very visible, and there is no
chance for one rival, by maintaining a low price, permanently to lock
up any significant chunk of business in the period before the other
rescinds its price increase.36 Each party's conduct is rational regard-
less of any prior communication or explicit assurance from the other.
Therefore, there is no basis for an inference that any explicit commu-
nication or agreement has occurred.
37
34 Indeed, in a cartel with not two, but many, participants, the degree of
confidence that rivals will cooperate may be quite limited.
35 In a more realistic example, it might take several iterations (i.e., a price
increase initiated, not followed, retracted, reinstituted, etc.) before a supra-
competitive equilibrium is reached, and that equilibrium might not replicate
exactly the cartel joint profit-maximizing price but instead be somewhere
between the competitive price and the cartel joint profit-maximizing price.
36 This is not to suggest that many classic cartels do not also display
some of the features (e.g., small number of firms, price transparency, etc.) that
would give rise to a degree of interdependence. Indeed, an interesting aspect
of the damage phase of private actions against cartels is the claim by the
defendants that, but for the conspiracy, prices would not be competitive but
rather much higher (perhaps approaching or approximating the cartel price)
due to oligopolistic interdependence.
37 In a sense, the degree of interdependence is so high that the parties can
act independently, i.e., without any prior communication or express commitment.
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III. TACIT OR IMPLICIT AGREEMENTS
What recourse does a plaintiff have when a defendant credibly
establishes the oligopoly defense; i.e., the defendant shows that while
the competitors' actions are very much interdependent, there is no rea-
son to posit a prior explicit agreement to explain the parallel conduct?
While each firm's conduct is rational only if its competitors act simi-
larly, the firm has every reason to be confident that they will do so
without the need for any explicit communication or prior commitment.
The threshold question posed is whether the Sherman Act actu-
ally requires an explicit agreement or whether liability can attach to
something less explicit, which might be referred to as a "tacit" or
"implicit" agreement. Some courts have indicated that an explicit
agreement, whether established through direct evidence or through
circumstantial evidence, is not necessary for firms to be liable under
the Sherman Act.38 In Interstate Circuit, the Court opined that, while
the circumstantial evidence of an actual agreement was persuasive,
there was an alternative path the government might have taken:
It is elementary that an unlawful conspiracy may be and often is formed
without simultaneous action or agreement on the part of the conspirators.
Acceptance by competitors, without previous agreement, of an invitation
to participate in a plan, the necessary consequence of which, if carried
out, is restraint of interstate commerce, is sufficient to establish an unlaw-
ful conspiracy under the Sherman Act.
39
The idea, then, is that a group of firms may be able to achieve cartel-
like results without any explicit communication, but they may be
3 It should be noted, however, that when some courts use the term
"tacit agreement" they mean simply to refer to any agreement, including an
explicit agreement that is established through circumstantial evidence rather
than through direct evidence. See, e.g., William E. Kovacic, The Identification
and Proof of Horizontal Agreements under the Antitrust Laws, 38 ANTITRUST BuLL.
5, 20 (1993). This use of the term "tacit agreement" may be careless from a
grammatical perspective and may confuse the issue of what kinds of circum-
stantial evidence can be used to establish the existence of an agreement, but
does not raise any novel theoretical issues. In what follows, however, the
focus is on whether there is a substantive, not merely evidentiary, basis for
the concept of tacit collusion.
39 Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 227 (1939) (citations
omitted).
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found to have engaged in or achieved a "tacit" agreement that is pro-
hibited by the Sherman Act. Of course, just as pure parallel conduct
cannot be used as the sole evidentiary basis for the finding of an
explicit agreement, neither can it support a finding of a tacit agree-
ment since parallel conduct can result from competitive conduct
when firms are confronting similar external forces such as increases in
their raw material costs. When that happens, each firm's decision is
made independent of what the others might do.
However, in our hypothetical, the firm initiating the price
increase is issuing an invitation which, if followed, results in a price
significantly above the competitive level (i.e., a restraint of com-
merce). When the rival matches the increase, it has accepted the invi-
tation. Therefore, the language of Interstate Circuit might suggest that
we have an unlawful conspiracy. We know that consumers are hurt
just as much as if there were an explicit cartel, and the parties are
acting just as they would have had they entered into an explicit
agreement. It would appear, then, that this is the perfect opportunity
to use the concept of a tacit or implicit agreement-a "meeting of the
minds." What's the problem?
Numerous commentators have discussed the theoretical and
practical problems associated with a finding of an unlawful conspir-
acy on such facts, notwithstanding the "invitation" of the Interstate
Circuit court.40 The consensus seems to be that, standing alone, the
pattern of conduct described in the hypothetical, which I have else-
where termed "pure oligopoly,"41 cannot-and should not--constitute
a Sherman Act violation. The core of the problem is that there is no
conduct that can fairly be described as "culpable." It would make no
sense, for example, to counsel a firm that it is free to raise prices but
only so long as those prices are not matched by a competitor, or that
the firm cannot match another competitor's higher price if it believes
that the higher price will increase its own profits. Alternatively,
40 See, e.g., Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the Sher-
man Act, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655, 663-66 (1962); see also John E. Lopatka &
William H. Page, Posner's Program for the Antitrust Division: A Twenty-Five
Year Retrospective, 48 SMU L. REV. 1713, 1719 (1995).
41 Hay, supra note 25.
HeinOnline -- 51 Antitrust Bull. 892 2006
HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS : 893
imagine counseling a firm that it can initiate a price increase without
fear that, if it is matched by competitors, they will all be guilty of a
Sherman Act violation, but only if that price increase is "cost-justified,"
i.e., it cannot fairly be labeled a "supra-competitive price." This
would make the difference between lawful and unlawful conduct
(with the associated criminal penalties and exposure to treble dam-
ages) turn on the size of the price increase or, rather, the court's ex
post evaluation of whether the price increase was reasonable, and
this is a task which Sherman Act courts have traditionally been reluc-
tant to accept.
42
Several courts have reached the same conclusion and have voiced
similar concerns. For example:
Courts have noted that the Sherman Act prohibits agreements, and they
have almost uniformly held, at least in the pricing area, that such individ-
ual pricing decisions (even when each firm rests its own decision upon its
belief that competitors will do the same) do not constitute an unlawful
agreement under Section 1 of the Sherman Act.43
Another example, from the Ninth Circuit:
To permit an antitrust violation to be based on the.., price pattern in this
case, without more, would require a company making wholly indepen-
dent pricing decisions to consider that the possible responses of its com-
petitors might render it liable for treble damages. Similarly, following
another company's price increase might very well provide the evidence
that a disgruntled customer would need to get to a jury in a treble dam-
age antitrust suit. It thus appears that permitting an inference of conspir-
42 In Addyston, Judge Taft suggested that any court that presumed to
accept the responsibility for deciding whether a given price was reasonable
would "set sail on a sea of doubt." United States v. Addyston Pipe & Steel
Co., 85 F. 271, 284 (6th Cir. 1898). The one notable dissent from this consensus
is the one Judge Posner referred to earlier. While Posner seems to believe that,
in fact, courts will not recognize the concept of tacit agreement at all, he advo-
cates using the label and condemning conduct even in circumstances that oth-
ers would describe as pure oligopolisitic interdependence. Put simply, Posner
believes that firms cannot achieve a supra-competitive price without engag-
ing in behavior that he would regard as culpable. RICHARD A. POSNER,
ANTITRUST LAW 51-60, 93-100 (2d ed. 2001).
43 Clamp-All Corp. v. Cast Iron Soil Pipe Inst., 851 F.2d 478, 484 (1st Cir.
1988) (citing Apex Oil Co. v. DiMauro, 822 F.2d 246, 253-54 (2d Cir. 1987);
North Carolina v. Chas. Pfizer & Co., 384 F. Supp. 265 (E.D.N.C. 1974)).
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acy from the parallel pricing evidence alone would result in an anticom-
petitive dislocation by distorting independent pricing decisions."
Therefore, if there is to be substance to the concept of a tacit agree-
ment, it must be defined in such a way that it does not extend to
supra-competitive pricing arising purely from oligopolistic interde-
pendence. If that can be done, there could then be four different ways
to characterize parallel conduct:
a) the conduct, albeit parallel, is independent and hence competitive;
consumers have not been injured and there is no reason to look
further for an explanation;
b) the parallel conduct is interdependent and hence not truly compet-
itive; the conduct is the result of an explicit agreement which can
be established through either direct or circumstantial evidence;
c) the parallel conduct is interdependent, and hence not truly com-
petitive; the conduct is the consequence solely of oligopolistic
interdependence; there is no reason to infer any kind of agreement;
d) the parallel conduct is interdependent and hence not truly compet-
itive; while there is no reason to believe that there was an actual
agreement, the conduct is not attributable solely to oligopolistic
interdependence; rather it was the result of a tacit agreement,
which can be established on the basis of circumstantial evidence.45
44 In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust
Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 444 (9th Cir. 1990). There may be a semantic confusion
embedded in the court's reference to the pricing as "independent." When
prices are at supra-competitive levels, the various firms' decisions are very
much interdependent. Nevertheless, the decision may be rational without any
prior communication among the firms given the structure of the market.
45 To be sure, some courts have expressed doubts about whether a tacit
agreement, however defined, violates the Sherman Act. As Judge Posner
noted in High Fructose Corn Syrup:
Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbids contracts, combinations, and
conspiracies in restraint of trade. This statutory language is broad
enough.., to encompass a purely tacit agreement to fix prices, that is,
an agreement made without any actual communication among the
parties to the agreement .... Nevertheless it is generally believed ...
that an express, manifested agreement, and thus an agreement involv-
ing actual, verbalized communication must be proved to be actionable
under the Sherman Act.
In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Litig., 295 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2002).
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The principal problem, as we have discussed, is in distinguishing
between (c) and (d).46 As I have said elsewhere, 47 telling a jury that it can
infer tacit collusion from circumstantial evidence (including plus fac-
tors) is not helpful unless the jury is given more information about what
it is actually looking for.46 Without a working definition of a tacit agree-
ment and an understanding of how it differs from pure oligopolistic
interdependence, there is no basis on which a jury can decide whether
or not a tacit agreement has occurred or why the hypothesis of a tacit
agreement is more plausible than the hypothesis of pure oligopolistic
interdependence. Unless the presence of certain plus factors is meant
actually to define a tacit agreement (rather than permit the jury to infer
such an agreement), the courts need to explain how, despite the pres-
ence of several of these plus factors and interdependent conduct, a jury
might rationally conclude that there was no tacit agreement, and that
the parallel conduct was the natural result of the oligopoly structure.4
9
46 A useful way to frame the problem is to imagine a situation in which the
jury is asking the trial judge for guidance. The jury has reported that they do not
believe that the prices are really competitive; they seem to be well above any
reasonable measure of costs and the parties seem to have been very profitable
over the relevant period. But the jury has also reported that they have not seen
any direct evidence of a formal agreement and the circumstantial evidence has
not persuaded them that the parties ever met or communicated in any way. The
judge explains to the jury that it is not necessary that the jury find that the par-
ties explicitly agreed so long as they find there was a tacit or implicit agreement,
but then must explain to the jury what actually is meant by the concept and how
it differs from conscious parallelism (i.e., pure oligopolisitic interdependence).
47 George A. Hay, The Meaning of "Agreement" under the Sherman Act:
Thoughts from the "Facilitating Practices" Experience, 16 REV. INDUS. ORG. 113, 128
(2000).
48 When juries are engaged in their more traditional role of inferring an
explicit agreement from circumstantial evidence, they know what they are
looking for and thus merely need to decide whether the circumstantial evi-
dence points unequivocally in that direction (as opposed to competitive con-
duct or conscious parallelism).
49 Of course, if the jury concludes that the conduct, although parallel, is
still independently rational, i.e., competitive, then there is no problem in
rejecting the section 1 claim, notwithstanding the presence of plus factors. But
the text refers to situations where it is clear that the conduct was interdepen-
dent, i.e., not really competitive, and the only issue is whether it is
attributable to a tacit agreement or solely to oligopolistic interdependence.
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IV. FACILITATING PRACTICES AND
OLIGOPOLISTIC INTERDEPENDENCE
A. Introduction
At the most general level, facilitating practices are actions taken
by the parties to make coordination easier or more effective. Thus one
could characterize the archetypical hotel room meeting as a facilitat-
ing practice because it makes reaching an agreement on price easier.
As the term has usually been applied, however, it has the narrower
meaning of specific actions taken by firms to make coordination eas-
ier or more effective without the need for an explicit agreement. The idea
is to fill in the gap between explicit agreement and pure oligopolistic
interdependence without simply invoking an epithet such as "tacit
agreement," and its attendant "plus factors," which may have little or
no operational content. 50 To make use of the facilitating practices
concept, I examine more closely those situations of interdependent
conduct where there is no evidence of an explicit agreement and the
defendant's claim is that the oligopoly structure of the market made
explicit agreement unnecessary. In the course of that examination I
analyze whether it is structure alone which explains the poor perfor-
mance of the market or, rather, whether the parties have taken certain
specific actions (short of formal agreement) without which the market
would likely have functioned more competitively.
B. Structural factors affecting successful coordination
To better understand the possible role of facilitating practices and
to provide background for the discussion of the cases that have
invoked the concept, it is useful to review briefly what is known
about the relation between market structure and market
performance. 51 At one extreme, even a formal, explicit agreement is
unlikely to be effective if the market structure is very unfavorable to
coordination. To take the simplest example, if there are one hundred
50 This does not necessarily imply abandonment of the term "tacit agree-
ment" but rather can be seen as an effort to make it operationally meaningful.
51 For an excellent summary of the relationship between market struc-
ture and market performance, and the role of game theory in effecting that
link, see Werden, supra note 32.
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roughly equal-sized firms in the market, even a formal cartel is
unlikely to be very effective for very long, absent the involvement of
the government as an organizer and enforcer.52 Thus, while there is
no bright line, a certain amount of concentration is a necessary condi-
tion for effective coordination.
53
More generally, for a cartel to be effective, two things are neces-
sary. First, the firms must be able to coordinate their actions, assuming
that they want to do so. If, for example, the product is not fungible, so
that each firm's offering is at least somewhat different from the offer-
ings of its rivals, and there are numerous firms, it will be more difficult
to agree on a particular price or array of prices, even if the firms spend
hours or days in direct contact with one another. The problem
becomes even more complex if important characteristics of the prod-
uct change over time either through marketing initiatives or through
actual technical improvement. Moreover, different firms will have dif-
ferent ideas about what constitutes the optimal cartel price either due
to divergent estimates of consumer demand or to different time hori-
zons and therefore different discount rates applied to future profits.5
4
These differences must be resolved in order for an agreement to be
effective. Face-to-face contact helps to resolve the differences but does
not guarantee that they will be successfully resolved.
52 For example, in the days before deregulation, the government,
through the Interstate Commerce Commission, effectively acted as a cartel
ringmaster for the trucking industry, which was not a highly concentrated
industry. Motor Carrier Act of 1935, 49 U.S.C.A. § 206(a) (repealed 1980)
(requiring that all interstate carriers be "certified" by the ICC, thus allowing
the Commission to implement uniform tariff rates, which effectively pre-
vented competition between large volume and small volume carriers).
53 See, e.g., George A. Hay & Daniel Kelley, An Empirical Survey of Price
Fixing Conspiracies, 17 J.L. & ECON. 13 (1974).
54 Thus, for example, as one reads about the discussions that take place
in the world's most public cartel, OPEC, one sees disputes about the possible
long-run consequences of setting the benchmark price for crude too high,
possibly leading to consumer substitution, technological change, or new
entry, with some OPEC members willing to take a much longer-run view
than other members, possibly reflecting a more advantageous short-run
wealth position, while other, less wealthy, countries may be more interested
in maximizing near-term profits.
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Second, assuming firms are able to cooperate, the firms must want
to cooperate; i.e., there must be incentives to cooperate rather than to
compete. Thus, for example, if prices are not transparent, so that firms
cannot easily monitor the prices being charged by their rivals, there
will be incentives to "cheat" even where the parties have reached an
explicit agreement, since the cheater may be able substantially to
increase its market share at prices only slightly less than the agreed-
upon cartel price. 55 This problem will be exacerbated if sales are
'lumpy" so that a lot of incremental business can be captured in the
window before rivals learn that one of them has been shading prices
below the "agreed upon" levels. If prices are not transparent and sales
are lumpy, even a formal cartel is unlikely to be successful absent
some extraordinary enforcement mechanism, because merely the risk
that the cartel agreement may collapse may not be enough to discour-
age cheating, given the potential short term gains from cheating.
5 6
So, at one market structure extreme, coordination may be so diffi-
cult and cheating so attractive that even a formal cartel may not be
effective.5 7 At the other market structure extreme, where there are only
a small number of competitors, the product is highly fungible, prices
are transparent, and sales are not particularly "lumpy," the parties
might be both able and willing to coordinate their activities without
any formal agreement or any other specific actions that might be
regarded as out of the ordinary. Thus, in the gas station example used
earlier, one firm (without prior consultation with its competitor)
55 Indeed, the very fact that the cartel price is above the competitive
price creates the incentive to cheat since, once price is elevated substantially
above incremental cost, there are substantial profits to be earned if one firm
can increase its own sales volume by shading prices only slightly.
56 If the gains from cheating are very temporary (because cheating can
be detected quickly) and small (because the cheater cannot garner substantial
sales volume during the window when its prices are lower than its rivals),
then simply the risk that cheating will undermine the cartel may be enough to
motivate firms to cooperate.
57 Hence, there may be some industries in which effective collusion
would be impossible to achieve even in the absence of legal prohibition. The
fact that the antitrust laws make formal collusion unlawful makes it that
much more difficult for a cartel to function effectively, since cartel activities
must be kept secret.
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makes an educated guess as to the profit-maximizing "cartel" price
and posts that price, and the other, noting the higher price, sees it as in
its own self-interest to match that price rather than to try to garner a
short-run advantage by offering a lower price (which would quickly
be matched by the original price setter). The result is a supra-competi-
tive price and supra-competitive profits but neither firm has done any-
thing that is likely to be regarded as actionable under section 1.58
C. Actions to overcome the structural factors
affecting successful coordination
Between the two extremes outlined above there is a large middle
range of industry structures in which effective coordination is feasi-
ble, but only if parties take certain steps to resolve the cartel problems
described above, i.e., to achieve some kind of understanding about
the ideal industry price (or array of prices) and to discourage cheating
by creating conditions that make cheating unlikely to be effective. In
some cases, these steps may include entering into an explicit agree-
ment, with face-to-face meetings or other forms of formal communi-
cation. In other cases, however, formal communication may not be
necessary as long as firms take certain specific steps (short of formal
communication) to facilitate a tacit agreement.
For example, suppose that in the normal course of business prices
are transparent, but only with a considerable lag. Each firm's prices
eventually become known (accurately) to its competitors, but only after
several weeks. Thus a firm that wants to initiate a price increase knows
that it will be at least several weeks before its rivals see the price
increase, who may then respond if they want to. This alone means that
the firm that initiates the price increase will stand to lose sales until its
rivals are able to respond. But, in addition, the rivals know that, if they
fail to match the increase, it will be another several weeks before the
first firm knows whether the others have followed. This may create an
58 This is true even if one might describe the parties as having a 'meet-
ing of the minds" as to the wisdom of maintaining price at the elevated label
and as to the foolishness of trying to gain a short-run advantage by cutting
price below that of one's rival. Hence, while one might use the words "tacit
agreement" to describe what is going on, applying the label does not advance
the legal analysis.
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incentive not to follow since in the multiweek window, enough busi-
ness can be captured to make it worthwhile. In any event, the risk for
the first firm becomes simply too much to bear and it makes the deci-
sion that it will not be the one to initiate a price increase unless subse-
quent cost increases make current prices not viable.
But suppose now the first firm decides to make its prices public
on the day that the higher prices are implemented. Then the rivals
immediately know what price to match if they want to. This then cuts
in half the window of exposure for the first firm.
59 The window is
reduced altogether if the rivals decide to announce their own price
decisions right away. Or, to take it even further, suppose the first firm
announces today that it intends to increase price to a specific amount
effective two weeks hence (with the implicit threat to rescind the price
increase if rivals do not promptly announce their own intentions to
match the price increase). This has the added advantage that, if one or
more rivals thinks that the first firm's announced price increase was
too much for industry profit maximization, any of them can "sug-
gest" a lower price in the window before any price increases have
taken effect, without causing the first firm to lose any sales as a result
of its rivals' failure to match its price exactly.
The idea, then, is that successful coordination would not be possi-
ble (or would be much less likely) without these extra steps-the
facilitating practices. There has been neither explicit agreement on
price nor even explicit agreement to make the price announcements
public. But the clear purpose of the public announcements was to
facilitate coordination and (by assumption) there was no other busi-
ness reason for making the public announcement about (future)
prices. The announcements are the arguably "culpable" acts that have
facilitated successful coordination on price. The question is whether
these culpable acts can be reconciled with the Sherman Act's require-
ment of an "agreement," and if so, how.
60
59 The rival firms know right away that the first firm has increased price
and they know the new price; but the first firm must still wait to learn
whether the rivals have followed.
60 Another tack would be to assert that there was a tacit agreement
among the firms to make price announcements public and that this agree-
ment was unreasonable and therefore unlawful. This simply takes us back to
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D. Fitting the facilitating practices concept
into the Sherman Act
To see how the concept of facilitating practices can fit into the
Sherman Act framework, consider the four different possible explana-
tions for parallel conduct discussed above:
a) the conduct, albeit parallel, is independent and hence competitive;
consumers have not been injured and there is no reason to look
further for an explanation;
b) the parallel conduct is interdependent and hence not truly compet-
itive; the conduct is the result of an explicit agreement which can
be established through either direct or circumstantial evidence;
c) the parallel conduct is interdependent, and hence not truly com-
petitive; the conduct is the consequence solely of oligopolistic
interdependence; there is no reason to infer any kind of agreement;
d) the parallel conduct is interdependent and hence not truly compet-
itive; while there is no reason to believe that there was an actual
agreement, the conduct is not attributable solely to oligopolistic
interdependence; rather it was the result of a tacit agreement,
which can be established on the basis of circumstantial evidence.
Recall the difficulty of trying to distinguish between (c)
oligopolisitic interdependence and (d) tacit agreement. By invoking
the concept of facilitating practices, we convert (d) into the following:
the issue of what constitutes a tacit agreement when there has been no discus-
sion among the firms about making such price announcements. If we are
going to use the phrase "tacit agreement," it is simpler just to say there was a
tacit agreement on price and deal with the conceptual and evidentiary prob-
lems directly.
Finally, there is one other potential approach that does not involve sec-
tion 1 at all. A plaintiff could seek to challenge the actions of one or more
firms as an attempt to monopolize, unlawful under section 2 of the Sherman
Act. The argument would be that the implementation of certain facilitating
practices by one or more firms would have or did have the consequence of
eliminating competition and permitting the industry to engage in monopoly
pricing. Possible support for this approach would be the Justice Department's
case against American Airlines for inviting its competitor, Braniff Airlines, to
cooperate on pricing. Since Braniff rejected American's overtures, there was
no conspiracy, and section 1 contains no direct prohibition of an attempt to
conspire. Hence, the government proceeded, successfully, under section 2. See
United States v. American Airlines, 743 F.2d 1114 (5th Cir. 1984).
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d) the parallel conduct is interdependent and hence not truly compet-
itive; while there is no reason to believe that there was an actual
agreement, the conduct is not the consequence solely of oligopolis-
tic interdependence; rather it depended critically on certain other
actions taken by the parties to facilitate coordination; while this
conduct would not normally by itself be unlawful, its use in this
context is culpable, and it is reasonable to label the conduct as
leading to, or as constituting, an unlawful tacit agreement.
E. Facilitating practices and the courts:
an illustrative survey
There have been relatively few cases focusing specifically on facili-
tating practices as the essence of the violation (and using the facilitat-
ing practices terminology) and several of the most important efforts to
apply the concept were settled rather than litigated. The following are
notable examples of the use of the facilitating practices approach.
61
1. GE-WESTINGHOUSE The first such case to gain widespread
attention was the Department of Justice's action against General
Electric (GE) and Westinghouse, which resulted in the modification of
a preexisting consent decree in 1977.62
In 1960, GE, Westinghouse, Allis-Chalmers, and four individuals
were indicted for fixing the prices of large turbine generators. The
criminal case ultimately resulted in the entry of guilty pleas by the
corporate defendants and nolo contendere pleas by the four individual
61 I do not discuss cases in which state-imposed regulations are alleged
to facilitate tacit collusion among private actors (e.g., state "post and hold"
statutes, which require liquor distributors to announce price lists and to
adhere to the posted prices). For an extensive discussion, see John E.
Lopatka & William H. Page, State Action and the Meaning of Agreement Under
the Sherman Act: An Approach to Hybrid Restraints, 20 YALE J. ON REG. 269, 310-18
(2003).
62 This summary is taken in large part from the Justice Department's
1977 Competitive Impact Statement in the GE-Westinghouse matter, United
States v. GE Co. (1977-1) Trade Cas. (CCH) 712, and is substantially identical
to the section on GE-Westinghouse that appeared in Hay, supra note 25.
Because the matter was not litigated, any "facts" provided in this summary
are essentially assertions of the Justice Department, and it must be assumed
that some of the conclusions drawn would have been resisted by the parties.
HeinOnline -- 51 Antitrust Bull. 902 2006
HORIZONTAL AGREEMENTS : 903
defendants, which in turn resulted in fines and, in the case of one
individual, a jail sentence. The companion civil case led to a consent
decree against the corporate defendants generally prohibiting price
fixing and the kinds of direct communications that had been at the
heart of the original conspiracy.
Vigorous price competition apparently prevailed in the industry
from 1960 into 1963. By 1962, Allis-Chalmers had withdrawn from the
market but there was still substantial overcapacity and prices contin-
ued to decline. Relatively few sales were made in any year, and the
pressure to obtain any given order was substantial. Moreover, the
product was not homogeneous and, although price books were used,
there was little adherence to published prices and considerable dis-
counting occurred on particular projects.
However, in May 1963, GE announced a new pricing policy,
which featured GE's intention to adhere to published prices on all
future transactions. The revised policy had a number of elements
designed to facilitate its success. 63 A key element was a revised price
book which contained simplified formulas and procedures for deter-
mining the book price of any given turbine generator and a published
multiplier to be applied to book prices at any given time so as to
determine the actual bid prices for any given project at that time. (For
example, the published multiplier for May 1963 was .75, which meant
that the price that would actually be quoted to any customer would
be .75 times the book price.) The use of the multiplier permitted GE to
make swift changes in price without the complexity inherent in print-
ing an entirely new price book. The combination of the announced
no-discount policy, the revised, simplified price book and the use of
the published multiplier made it much easier for Westinghouse to
know what GE would bid on any given turbine generator project and
therefore easier to match GE's price, if it wanted to.
Another key feature of the new policy was the use of "price protec-
tion" clauses in all future contracts with customers. Under these
63 In what follows, I identify only the major elements of the policy.
Readers who are not already familiar with the GE-Westinghouse matter can
consult the Competitive Impact Statement or other sources such as Hay, supra
note 25.
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clauses, if GE lowered its price for a particular customer, then every
other customer who had paid list price during the previous six months
would be entitled retroactively to the same discount. The consequence
of the price protection clause was that selective price cuts in individual
transactions could not be employed by GE without imposing substan-
tial penalties on itself in the form of retroactive discounts to other cus-
tomers. The result was to give assurance to Westinghouse that GE
would be adhering to its stated policy of not giving discounts. In other
words, the price protection clause removed any incentive to "cheat."
The net effect of all aspects of the new GE policy was to make it
possible for Westinghouse to match exactly GE's prices if it wanted to
and to give some assurance to Westinghouse that, in matching GE's
published prices, it would not be incurring any risk of being secretly
undercut by selective discounts. This did not guarantee, of course,
that Westinghouse would in fact match GE's prices, but there would
be a strong incentive to do so, lest GE rescind the new policy and the
industry revert to the "cutthroat competition" that characterized the
1960-early 1963 period. In any event, any element of uncertainty was
quickly eliminated when Westinghouse published its own price book
(essentially equivalent to GE's) and adopted its own price protection
clause in 1964. (In the interim, Westinghouse quoted prices based on
GE's published price book.) Subsequently, there was a pattern of
identical, nondiscounted prices for at least the next several years.
There was no evidence of any formal communication or agreement
between GE and Westinghouse, either an agreement on price or an
agreement to implement the price book or the price protection clause.
Had the Justice Department litigated the matter from scratch, it
likely would have asserted that the specific actions taken "constituted"
an unlawful agreement under section 1. In effect, the claim would
have been that the independent yet parallel adoption of the new policy
by GE and Westinghouse had brought about a meeting of the minds
and facilitated the elimination of price competition. However, when the
Department informed GE and Westinghouse that it was prepared to
file a civil antitrust suit and indicated the relief it would seek, the par-
ties offered to settle the matter, and provide all the relief that was
desired, so long as it was treated as a modification of the outstanding
1962 consent decree rather than a consent in a new, freestanding, law-
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suit. For reasons spelled out in the Competitive Impact Statement
(acknowledging the risks inherent in any litigation based on a some-
what novel theory), the Department accepted the offer, and the decree,
containing significant restrictions on future behavior, was entered in
1977. However, while the court entered the modification of the consent
decree as requested, this required merely that the court find the modi-
fication to be in the public interest, and there is no significant sense in
which the court demonstrated its agreement with the Department's
theory of what constitutes an agreement.64
2. PETROLEUM PRODUCTS Petroleum Products65 was a private treble
damages action under section 1 in which the plaintiffs (several states)
were appealing a district court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of a number of the major oil companies operating in the western
United States. The basic allegations were that the defendants engaged
in various methods of disseminating information concerning their
wholesale prices, including press releases (sometimes in advance of
the effective date) and "posting" of the prices at various locations that
were accessible to the other defendants. In part because the wholesale
customers for each refiner (the distributors) were contractually bound
to buy from that refiner (i.e., they could not "shop around" for better
prices from other refiners) and in part based on other evidence, the
appellate court concluded that there could be no other purpose for
the dissemination of wholesale prices than to inform competitors of
one another's price movements so as to make it easier for competitors
to follow those movements. The court found that these actions had
allowed the defendants to maintain supra-competitive wholesale and
retail prices for gasoline sold at the wholesale level.
64 A case with some features in common with GE-Westinghouse was
Jays Foods v. Nat'l Classification Comm'n, 646 F. Supp. 604 (E.D. Va. 1985),
in which it was alleged that a trade association published a rate classification
manual that facilitated the actual fixing of rates for the shipment of agricul-
tural commodities. The court concluded that the manual did not in fact have
the effect of allowing the competitors to fix or coordinate rates. It is unclear
what the court would have decided if it had concluded that, while there was
no agreement on the actual rates, the manual facilitated coordination of rates.
65 In re Coordinated Pretrial Proceedings in Petroleum Prods. Antitrust
Litig., 906 F.2d 432, 444 (9th Cir. 1990).
HeinOnline -- 51 Antitrust Bull. 905 2006
906 : THE ANTITRUST BULLETIN: Vol. 51, No. 4/Winter 2006
Under these circumstances, the court asserted, "[a] jury could con-
clude that the oil companies agreed, either implicitly or explicitly, to
create market conditions that would facilitate tacit or express price
coordination." 66 It is interesting (and perhaps unfortunate) that the
court invoked the notion of agreement twice: the parties agreed (either
implicitly or explicitly) to facilitate an agreement (explicit or tacit) on
price. If in fact a jury concludes that there is a tacit agreement on price,
it is unclear whether or why they must also conclude that there was an
agreement (either tacit or explicit) to engage in the facilitating practices.
It is also unclear how the jury is supposed to decide whether there was
a tacit agreement on price unless the court is in effect instructing the
jury that the use of facilitating practices to coordinate prices constitutes
a tacit agreement and, if so, whether it is necessary that the jury also
find an agreement to engage in the facilitating practices.
67
3. AIRLINE TARIFF PUBLISHING (ATP) In another nonlitigated
application of the facilitating practices approach, the Justice
Department filed a Sherman Act complaint against the major airlines
alleging that the airlines signaled one another about possible future
prices with the intent and effect of suppressing price competition.
68
All the major airlines are linked by computer, and all submit
information about their own fares and are able to receive information
about fares of rival airlines. This fare information also provides the
core of the computerized reservation systems used by travel agents.
The airlines allegedly used the computer link to communicate
intentions about fares to be charged in the future. The Department's
press release asserted: "The airlines engaged in a process that
involved repeated exchanges through ATP [the computer network] of
66 Id. at 448.
67 To complicate matters, a subsequent Ninth Circuit decision asserted
that the court in Petroleum Products found evidence of a (formal) agreement,
so that the discussion of facilitating practices as a possible Sherman Act viola-
tion was dictum. See In re Citric Acid Litigation, 191 F.3d 1090, 1096 (1999).
6 United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 836 F. Supp. 9 (D.D.C.
1993); United States v. Airline Tariff Publ'g Co., 1994-2 Trade Cas. 70, 687
(D.D.C. 1994); see also Severin Borenstein, Rapid Price Communication and Coor-
dination: The Airline Tariff Publishing Case (1994), in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION
(J. Kwoka & L. White eds., 1999).
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price increase proposals and counterproposals, with the effect of
raising fares to consumers." 69 A principal allegation was that an
individual airline would indicate in the computer that a fare increase
on a given route for a given travel period would be implemented, not
immediately, but at some time in the near future, e.g., in seven days.
For travelers purchasing tickets during the seven-day window, the
proposed increase would be irrelevant, as the fares would still be
identical, so the airlines initiating the fare increase would not expect
to lose any sales to its competitors during this period. The seven-day
window would allow the first airline to see if its competitors would
match the price increase (effective the same day). If so, the new fares
would go into effect on the same day for all the airlines. If not, the
first airline could simply rescind the proposed increase before the end
of the seven-day period without having suffered any lost sales (as it
would have had it initiated the price increase effective immediately
and its rivals had not matched).
The Justice Department's claim was that this process allowed air-
lines to exchange "assurances" about future fares in the same fashion
as members of a cartel, sitting around a table in a smoke-filled room,
saying, in effect, "I'll raise prices next week if you will." In more com-
plex scenarios, airlines allegedly "negotiated" the precise amount of
the increase if they had different ideas about the most profitable price.
The Department claimed that this constituted an illegal agreement
under section 1. The matter was settled with a consent decree in
which the airlines agreed to eliminate advance announcement of price
increases. While the complaint alleged agreement, there was no plau-
sible claim that, when an airline announced a fare increase, it did so
with any assurance that rivals would follow, since many announced
fare increases were rescinded or modified. Rather the essence of the
claim had to be that the parallel use of advance price announcements
facilitated the coordination of price changes by eliminating the risk of
initiating a price increase. 70
69 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Files Price Fix-
ing Suit Against Eight Airlines and Fare Dissemination System (Dec. 21,
1992), http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/press-releases/1992/211323.htm.
70 An alternative interpretation, which avoids the need to allege a tacit
agreement on price, would be that the parties agreed to use advance
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4. TODD v. EXXON Todd v. Exxon 71 is one of a number involving
the exchange of pricing information. 72 Here, the information was
about salaries paid to various categories of employees and it was
exchanged among several oil and petrochemical companies that were
the primary employers for these types of employees. Plaintiffs
claimed that salaries were set at artificially low levels and that the
exchange of salary information was a key explanatory factor. The
opinion discusses two different ways that such information
exchanges might be analyzed. The first involves a combination of the
plus factors approach with the facilitating practices approach. The
plaintiff alleges an agreement on price. In the absence of "smoking
gun" evidence, the agreement would be inferred on the basis of
conscious parallelism when such interdependent conduct is
accompanied by plus factors. The plus factors would include
price announcements and that these facilitated coordination of price
increases, but any agreement on the use of advance price announcements
would have to have been a tacit agreement, since there was no allegation of
any explicit agreement in this regard. This takes us back to the issue of what
distinguishes a tacit agreement to use advance price announcements from
merely conscious parallelism in the use of such announcements. Advance
announcement of price changes was also an issue in Reserve Supply Corp. v.
Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., 971 F.2d 37 (7th Cir. 1992). The court indi-
cated that advance announcements might have the effect of facilitating the
parallel pricing that characterized the industry, but rejected this aspect of
plaintiff's claim because it concluded that the practice served an important
legitimate purpose. And as a small element in a much larger set of allega-
tions, plaintiffs in the Williamson Oil case claimed that the cigarette compa-
nies' use of "credit memos" effectively constituted advance announcement of
price increases, which in turn facilitated parallel pricing. However, the court
disagreed that the credit memos had this effect. Williamson Oil Co., Inc. v.
Philip Morris, 346 F.3d 1287, 1294-96 (11th Cir. 2003).
71 275 F.3d 191 (2d Cir. 2001).
72 The Blomkest case, discussed supra section II D, involved allegations of
information exchanges about price ("price verifications") but the opinion was
not framed in the language of facilitating practices. Blomkest Fertilizer, Inc. v.
Potash Corp. of Sask., 203 F.3d 1028 (8th Cir. 2000). The case is better seen as a
contest between the plaintiff, alleging a price-fixing agreement that can be
established through circumstantial evidence (including plus factors), and the
defendant, claiming that any parallelism in prices was the natural result of
oligopolisitic interdependence.
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defendants' use of facilitating practices such as information
exchanges. In this version, the plaintiff must allege an agreement on
price but the court does not indicate that the plaintiff must also allege
an agreement to exchange information.73 The second variant
dispenses with the need to allege an agreement on price but requires
an allegation that the parties agreed to exchange price information.
This agreement can be evaluated under the rule of reason as to
whether it had a significant anticompetitive effect. This version is the
lineal descendant of the Container Corp. case, 74 except that the
confusion at the time of the decision as to whether such information
exchanges could be held illegal per se has since been clarified in
subsequent cases.75 So the second version, while it might be seen as
implementing a facilitating practices framework, neither requires the
language of facilitating practices nor involves any advance in the law
relating to the exchange of information.76
5. DU PONT v. FTC ("ETHYL") The Ethyl case77 differs from the other
cases discussed in several important respects. First, it was brought not
under the Sherman Act but by the Federal Trade Commission under
the section 5 of the FTC Act78 alleging that the conduct complained of
73 However, it would not be a major leap to infer an agreement to
exchange information since there is no plausible explanation why one com-
pany would provide information on its own salaries unless there was a quid
pro quo that the others would provide similar information on their own
salaries.
74 United States v. Container Corp., 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
75 The process of clarification is discussed in the Todd opinion, 275 F.3d
at 198-99. Key cases include United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'l Bank, 422
U.S. 86, 113 (1975), and United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441
(1978).
76 In the actual case, the plaintiff did not allege any actual agreement
among defendants to fix salaries so only the second approach was used by
the court in rejecting defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint.
77 E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 729 F.2d
128 (2d Cir. 1984).
78 15 U.S.C.A. § 45. It is generally accepted that any conduct that violates
the Sherman Act a fortiori violates section 5. More controversial is whether
section 5 prohibits conduct that would not violate the Sherman Act.
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constituted an "unfair method of competition." 79 Second, while the
basic conduct being attacked was analytically similar to the
facilitating practices cases brought under the Sherman Act, the FTC
specifically (and deliberately) did not allege any agreement among
the respondents, either an agreement on prices or an agreement to
adopt the facilitating practices. Rather the basic claim was that the
parallel use of facilitating practices by several of the defendants, with
the effect of reducing (price) competition among them, constituted an
unfair method of competition under section 5. Given the limitations
of the statute, only injunctive relief was sought. There could be no
criminal penalties and there would have been no private right of
action based on a finding that section 5 had been violated.
The case has been extensively discussed in the literature.80 The
respondents were the four producers of lead antiknock additives for
gasoline. The challenged practices were: (1) quoting prices on a uni-
form delivered price basis; (2) announcing price increases to customers
and to the press well in advance of the effective date of the price
increase; and (3) including in contracts with individual customers a
clause requiring the seller to extend to that customer any discount
offered to any other customer. Both the administrative law judge and
the full Commission determined that the conduct violated section 5,
but those findings were overturned by the Second Circuit. While not
completely rejecting the fundamental legal argument on which the
79 The FTC has brought other cases under section 5 based on defen-
dants' use of price signaling as an illegal facilitating practice. See, e.g., YKK
Inc., [1993-1997 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 91 23,355, at 23,030
(July 1, 1993) (consent order); AE Clevite, Inc., [1993-1997 Transfer Binder]
Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH) 23,354, at 23,029 (June 8, 1993) (consent order);
Quality Trailer Prods. Corp., [1993-1997 Transfer Binder] Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 23,246, at 22,932 (Nov. 5, 1992) (consent order).
80 I have written about it myself on several occasions from the perspec-
tive of the expert witness for the FTC. See, e.g., Hay, supra note 47, at 128;
George A. Hay, Practices that Facilitate Cooperation: the Ethyl Case, in THE
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION (J. Kwoka & L. White eds., 1999). For other (perhaps
less biased) discussions, see, e.g., Lee Goldman, Oligopoly Policy and the Ethyl
Corp. Case, 65 OR. L. REV. 73 (1986); Donald S. Clark, Price-Fixing Without Col-
lusion: An Antitrust Analysis of Facilitating Practices After Ethyl Corp., 1983 Wis.
L. REV. 887 (1983).
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complaint was based (that parallel adoption of certain facilitating prac-
tices can violate section 5 if the consequence is a substantial reduction
in competition), the court rejected the application of the theory to the
facts in a way that suggests some of the obstacles that may confront a
plaintiff seeking to use the facilitating practices language and theory in
a Sherman Act case. Rather than debate the merits of the Second Cir-
cuit's analysis, it is sufficient simply to flag those potential problems.
First, not all competition had been eliminated. There was still
some price competition (largely from the two smaller competitors
that engaged in some discounting) and some nonprice competition
(among all of the defendants). In a classic horizontal price fixing case,
evidence of some continuing competition will not relieve defendants
of liability if the court finds that they have agreed (explicitly or tac-
itly) on price. However, if all of the evidence is circumstantial, then
the strength of the inference of an agreement will vary inversely with
the extent of price competition, although there is no theoretical
bright-line test for how much residual price competition would be
fatal to plaintiff's case.8
1
Second, given that the industry was highly concentrated, and the
product was fungible, even in the absence of the facilitating practices,
the strong interdependence would have some dampening effect on
price competition; i.e., it would not be expected that the industry
would perform perfectly competitively. Of course in a traditional Sher-
man Act case where the agreement to fix price has been established, it
is no defense to liability (although it may be relevant to the amount of
damages in a private treble-damages action) to say that, even in the
"but for" world, there would not have been vigorous competition any-
way. But in a case where the plaintiff is asking the jury to infer a tacit
agreement based on the parallel use of facilitating practices, an argu-
ment that the practices had no impact on the degree of competition
because, even without the practices, there would have been no greater
degree of competition, would be damaging to the plaintiff's case. The
81 It is not clear how the presence of nonprice competition would affect
the inference of an agreement. One might argue that a certain degree of non-
price competition can be the natural effect of an agreement on price. Of
course, if there is extensive nonprice competition it will ultimately undermine
the stability of any agreement on price.
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practical question confronting the plaintiff will be to establish how
much of a difference, as compared to the "but for" world, the facilitat-
ing practices made, and then the legal or policy question of how much
of a difference is required for the plaintiff's case to have merit.
Third, whether or not the parties recognized the ongoing effect of
the practices in suppressing price competition, the practices had not
originally been implemented for that purpose, 2 and there was a plausi-
ble argument that the practices continued to generate some efficiencies.
For section 1 purposes, this raises the question of whether the plaintiff
must show that the parties implemented or maintained the use of the
facilitating practices with the purpose of suppressing price competition
or at least with the knowledge that they had this effect and the further
question of whether any efficiency rationale is fatal to the plaintiff's
case and, if not, how to do whatever balancing is called for.
V. CONCLUSION
Whatever the underlying economic theory, a plaintiff seeking to
succeed under section 1 of the Sherman Act must still allege an unlaw-
ful agreement. If the courts were wedded to the notion that an agree-
ment must be explicit to be unlawful, then the concept of facilitating
practices would have little practical value.83 Thus, even if the
economist made a persuasive case that the parties did in fact coordi-
nate their actions, and that their ability to do so was due in substantial
measure to the use of certain practices that facilitated the coordination,
and that the practices had little or no independent justification, the
plaintiff would still confront the question: "Where is the agreement?"
But at least in principle, some courts have accepted the notion that
there can be an illegal agreement even when no words are exchanged
82 The practices had originally been implemented by the Ethyl Corpora-
tion when it was the monopoly supplier of the product.
83 The theory might still be usefully applied to practices such as agree-
ments to exchange information in order to explain how such an exchange can
lead to supra-competitive prices. But in such cases, the agreement that the
courts focus on is the agreement to exchange information and such agree-
ments are evaluated under the rule of reason. This breaks no new legal
ground. See supra notes 74-75 and accompanying text.
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and no formal commitments are made. That a tacit agreement can still
be an unlawful agreement is not a novel proposition. What the facili-
tating practices approach contributes is a way to make the concept of
tacit agreement operationally meaningful and to distinguish a tacit
agreement from conscious parallelism or mere oligopolisitic interde-
pendence. The suggestion is that when a group of firms has managed
to coordinate their actions in such a way as to achieve supra-competi-
tive prices (or some other anticompetitive result) and that coordina-
tion was facilitated by certain practices that the firms have engaged in
which have no offsetting business justification, then the coordination
can be described as constituting a tacit (and therefore unlawful)
agreement.T m
This is not to say that the facilitating practices approach is a plain-
tiff's panacea. The Ethyl case suggests that, even if the court accepts
the general approach, there will still be substantial evidentiary bur-
dens that the plaintiff must overcome8 But some of these are really
no different from those that the plaintiff faces any time it is asking the
court to infer an agreement from circumstantial evidence.
The one feature that may be somewhat unique to the facilitating
practices approach is the issue of whether there is a "business justifi-
cation" for the practices and how powerful that defense ought to be.
Does a plaintiff have to show that there is utterly no legitimate pur-
pose served by the practice, or merely that the anticompetitive effects
significantly outweigh any procompetitive justification? In a world of
perfect evidence, the latter should be adequate, but the world is not
84 Since the "agreement" is the coordination of activity through inappro-
priate means (the facilitating practices), it should not really be necessary that
the firms agreed to engage in the practices. That said, in many cases, since the
facilitating practices are not "normal" business practices, it should be possible
to argue that each firm would not have engaged in the practices without
some understanding that rivals would do the same. But there will be excep-
tions, so it is important to maintain the principle that no agreement to engage
in the practices is required.
85 E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Federal Trade Comm'n, 729 F.2d
128, 137 (2d Cir. 1984). And, of course, Ethyl was brought under section 5 of
the FTC Act, with no criminal penalties and no private right of action. One
should not be optimistic that a section 1 court will be less demanding.
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perfect and the Ethyl opinion suggests that the plaintiff has a major
problem if defendant can show even a modest efficiency rationale.86
Despite these evidentiary problems, the facilitating practices
approach has merit. Indeed, it may provide the best solution yet to
the puzzling question: "What is a tacit agreement?" However, despite
recognition by a few courts, the concept is still nascent and thus it
remains to be seen whether facilitating practices analysis will be
accepted as a legitimate approach under section 1 of the Sherman Act.
86 Ethyl, 729 F.2d at 139-40. A similar issue may arise where the plaintiff
is asserting that the fact that defendants were often in contact with one
another (e.g., at trade association meetings) should support an inference of
agreement. Defendants will want some limiting instruction to the effect that
trade association meetings are normal and legitimate and that merely the fact
that the firms were together should not suggest that they necessarily did any-
thing unlawful.
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